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A Public Good Version of the Collective Household Model: 




In this paper we consider an empirical collective household model of time allocation for two-
earner households. The novelty of this paper is that we estimate a version of the collective 
household model, where the internally produced goods and the externally purchased goods 
are assumed to be public. The empirical results suggest that: (1) Preferences of men and 
women differ; (2) Although there are significant individual variations, on average the utility 
functions of men and women are equally weighted in the household utility function; (3) 
Differences in the ratio of the partners' hourly wages are explanatory for how individual 
utilities are weighted in the household utility function. (4) The female's preference for 
household production is influenced by family size, but this does not hold for the male; (5) 
Both the male and the female have a backward-bending labor supply curve; (6) Labor-supply 
curves are forward-bending with respect to the partner's wage rate; (7) Our model rejects the 
unitary Slutsky symmetry condition. 
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encouraging remarks. 1 Introduction
It is now recognized that, if a male and a female are living together, in almost all cases the
partners will not act in splendid isolation. Their way of spending money and of spending their
time, both within the household and on the labor market, will be interdependent. Hence,
a separate analysis of male and female labor supply may be deceptive when we ignore this
potential interdependency.
The obvious setting in which to study this joint labor supply vector is a non-unitary
model. The essential innovation of this non-unitary view is the recognition that the husband
and the spouse in a household are separate individuals with their specic preferences.1 In
this paper we use a collective model of household behavior. Following the collective view,
spouses are living together, so to speak, in a Pareto-equilibrium. This is an equilibrium
situation, both with respect to the level of what is bought and consumed and with respect
to the level of hours supplied by the two household members to the labor market and to
household production .
The labor choice of the female aects not only the consumption and utility level of the
female but also that of the husband. The household income is a kind of public good (Y )
within the household2. This does not imply that out of the household income no commodities
are bought that can only be consumed by one of the two spouses, e.g. clothing, the barber,
etc., but it does imply that even then a purchase by one of them needs the explicit or
implicit approval of the other partner. It is an issue of the power distribution between the
two partners who in the end gets most of the pie. Actually, we may discern two sides of the
coin with respect to the male's (and the female's) outside labor supply. His direct labor eort
(or enjoyment) is his own, but the ensuing money outcome of his labor is shared with his
partner and hence also aects the partner's utility function through the household income.
The second public good in the household is what we call the level of household care
1See, among others: Grossbard (1976), Grossbard-Shechtman (1984), Kooreman & Kapteyn (1987),
McElroy (1990), Carlin (1990), McElroy (1990), Duguet & Simonnet (2007).
2See also Browning, Chiappori & Lechene (2006), who show that income pooling is neither necessary nor
sucient to describe a household as a unitary household.
2(H), dened as the sum of hours spent by both partners on what they call `household tasks'.
These tasks include cooking, cleaning, doing the laundry and other such activities. Of course,
the distinction between housework and leisure may be ambiguous, and therefore we leave
the empirical denition to the respondents themselves. Some love cooking and see it as a
leisure activity; others hate cooking and see it as housework. Here again the direct eort
(or enjoyment) linked to housework is for the individual who spends his time on it, but the
ensuing product is a public good H, and hence also aects the partner's utility function
through H.
In household economics it is generally assumed that households face two interconnected
decision problems. The rst problem is how to divide the hours of male and female over
the dierent time- consuming categories. The second problem is how to divide the income
earned among various consumption categories. In this paper we explain the `time spending'
problem, while we leave the consumer spending problem aside, since we do not have the
relevant information in our data set (see Browning & Grtz, 2005, where time and money
spending is studied simultaneously).
In recent years dierent theoretical models have been developed that describe how house-
holds solve the `time using' problem. The rst and oldest approach is the unitary model
developed by Mincer (1963), Becker (1965, 1991) and Lancaster (1966). The unitary model
equates households with a single (selfish) individual, even though these households may
be multi-person households. The restriction imposed on household behavior by the uni-
tary model is that the Slutsky matrix must be symmetric. This condition implies that the
marginal compensated wage changes of the two partners must have the same eect on each
other's labor supply. This assumption seems unrealistic and therefore we cannot apply the
unitary model. We explicitly start from the notion that it is important who in the household
generates income, and that wage changes of the two partners may have dierent eects on
each other's labor supply (see also Browning et al., 2006).
Currently, there are many empirical papers that reject the assumptions of the unitary
model: see, among others Thomas (1990), Browning, F, Bourguignon, Chiappori & Lechene
3(1994), Lundberg, Pollak & Wales (1997), Fortin & Lacroix (1997), Browning & Chiappori
(1998), Blundell, Chiappori, Magnac & Meghir (2007). Excellent recent surveys are given
by Vermeulen (2002), Browning et al. (2006) and Donni (2008).
In the 1980s Chiappori (1988, 1992, 1997) and Apps & Rees (1988) introduced the col-
lective model (CM) of household behavior. The CM approach starts from the minimal
assumption that the outcome of the household decision process should be a Pareto-ecient
outcome. As compared with the unitary model this model does not impose Slutsky symmetry
or income pooling.
The early empirical approaches focused mainly on the development of theory and on
testing and refuting the unitary model. Over the last 20 years, more and more empirical
approaches are using the collective setting as the basic framework.3 However, less attention
is given to the allocation of time where domestic work is taken into account. Exceptions
are Apps & Rees (1997), Apps & Rees (1999), Rapoport, Sofer & Solaz (2005) and Couprie
(2007).
In the present paper we develop a structural collective household model of time allocation,
assuming that internally produced household services and externally purchased market goods
are public goods in the household, while the direct time expenditures by each partner (paid
work, housework and leisure) aect only the utility of the individual time spender. A public
good is usually understood to be a good where the consumption by one person does not
exclude the consumption of the same good by another person. Here we stretch the concept
somewhat as, for instance, the consumption of going to the barber, although nanced out
of the common purse, can only be for one partner. In the present situation the public
good is characterized by the fact that personal `inputs' do not automatically equal personal
`outputs'. For instance, when considering the traditional household model where only the
male earns labor income, then part of that money is spent by the female in favor of herself.
Similarly, the housework performed by the female is also enjoyed by the male.
In the Pareto-equilibrium of the collective (non-unitary) model, the equilibrium may be
3See, among others , Fortin & Lacroix (1997), Chiappori, Fortin & Lacroix (2002), Blundell, Chiappori,
Magnac & Meghir (2007), Browning & Grtz (2005), Donni (2008) and Donni and Moreau (2007).
4described as the result of optimizing the household utility function, which is dened as a
weighted sum of the male's and the female's utility function. The weights are generally
referred to as Pareto-weights. A crucial and necessary assumption in the CM is that the
Pareto-weights depend on exogenous variable(s) like the wage rates of both household mem-
bers, because otherwise the model would coincide with the unitary model.
The empirical model that we are to estimate in this paper is similar to the theoretical
model described in a recent paper by Chiappori & Ekeland (2006). There they derive the-
oretically when collective household models are non-parametrically identiable. One of the
specic identiable cases they refer to is a model where at least one consumption good of
each household member is an exclusive good. In our model we consider each spouse's leisure
as an exclusive good and assume that consumption goods are public.4
We propose an iterative estimation method, by which it is possible to estimate (ordinal)
utility functions of both the male and the female and to estimate the Pareto-weight as a
function of individual wages. In addition the wage-, child- and non-labor-income eects on
time-spending behavior are obtained for both partners. For this purpose we use data from
the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS).
We note that the model is estimated on a restricted data set of households where both
partners have a paid job, and this may induce a selectivity bias. However, formulating a
collective model where we also consider corner solutions is beyond the scope of this paper.
The structure of this paper is a follows. In Section 2 we develop the collective model to
be estimated. In Section 3 the estimation method is explained. In Section 4 we describe
the data that are used and we present the estimation results. In Section 5 we discuss the
policy-relevant wage-, child- and non-labor-income eects in terms of elasticities and cross-
elasticities between partners. Section 6 concludes.
4We notice that in Chiappori (1988, 1992) consumption goods are assumed to be purely private, while in
our paper they are considered as public goods.
52 The Model
Before introducing the collective model it is useful to make a digression to the literature
of individual labor supply. In the theory of individual labor supply the individual utility
function is U = U(q;t), where q stands for a consumption bundle of market goods and t
for a vector of time expenditures, say (t1;t2;t3), denoting leisure, housework and job hours,
respectively. Utility is maximized under the budget constraint w  t3 = p 0q and the time
budget constraint t1+t2+t3 = T, where w stands for hourly wage. If we have no information
about consumption q, we assume a Hicksian composite commodity, the value of which is
income y (= wt3). Then we may write the utility function as U = U(y(t3);t1;t2;t3). We note
that this is not an indirect utility function, since here y stands for a composite commodity.
This somewhat unusual expression demonstrates that spending time t3 on paid work has
two eects on utility. The rst is positive as working generates income, i.e. consumption.
The second eect is mostly assumed to be negative as the working eort is thought to
reduce utility.5 In a similar way we might split the household eort t2 into two eects: a
positive eect with respect to the level of household care H = H (t2), where H(t2) stands
for the household production function, and a negative eect because most people do not
like the eort identied with housework t2.6 Including H we may write in a similar way
U = U(y;H;t) = U(y(t3);H(t2);t1;t2;t3), where both t2 and t3 gure twice, once in their
`input'-role, and once in their `output'-role. Obviously, these formulations look a bit like
hair-splitting in the individual case. However, in the collective case this distinction makes
sense as the input eort may fall on one partner while both partners or even, exclusively,
the other partner, may enjoy the output.
More precisely, we may write the utility function of household member i as:7
Ui = Ui(Y (t3m;t3f);H(t2m;t2f);t1i;t2i;t3i); i = (m;f)
5It may be, as many psychologists and sociologists claim, that participation as such is welfare increasing.
Then we have two positive eects.
6Note that some men and women like household work as a way of self-realization, that is, it is utility
increasing. In that case, the eort eect would be positive.
7For a similar argument see also Grossbard, 2005: 217)
6.
Let us now rename our variables in a more familiar way. We assume that both partners i
(= m;f) have a log-additive utility function in the individual variables leisure lei, housework
hours whi, job hours jhi (= T  lei whi), and the public goods: household income (Y ) and
household care level (H). We specify the household production function as the productivity
weighted sum of the hours that both partners spend on household activities, i.e. H =
(whm + 
  whf). As a result of the inclusion of the variable H, we are able to make a
distinction between the eect of the individual's household input eort (wh) and the eect
of the provision level of the public good H on the individual. Moreover, we assume that the
utility eect of H depends on the family size fs. More precisely, the spouse spending 20 hours
on household production for a two-person family may derive less (or more) satisfaction from
that eort than the spouse who spends 20 hours for a family with two children in addition
to her husband. Therefore, we add an interaction term between family size and household
hours. The ordinal utility functions of household members i = m(ale), f(emale) are then
written as:
Ui = i;1 ln(Y ) + [i;2 + i;2I ln(fs + 1)]  ln(H) + i;3 ln(lei)
+ i;4 ln(whi) + i;5 ln(jhi)
(1)
where household income Y equals:
Y = wm(T   lem   whm) + wf(T   lef   whf) + yu
and the household care level (H) is dened as:
H = whm + 
  whf
while yu stands for non-labor income. We note that,as usual in these models, the utility
functions have to be interpreted as describing a net of indierence curves. Hence, the analysis
does not change if we apply a monotonic transformation on utility or normalize by requiring
the coecients to add up to 1 or another non-zero constant.
7According to the collective approach, we can describe household n's behavior as the
outcome of maximizing a household utility function of the following type:
Un;h = nUn;m + (1   n)Un;f (2)
with respect to lem, whm, lef and whf. The individual preferences are represented by Un;i
and the utility weight is represented by n with 0    1. Furthermore,  varies over
households as a function of wages and possibly other variables that in
uence bargaining
within the household. In addition, household members face the following constraints:
lei + whi + jhi = T i = m;f
Y = wm  jhm + wf  jhf + yu
H = whm + 
  whf
The parameter 
 stands for the productivity of the female in terms of male hours. The total
weekly time endowment of 168 hours is denoted as T. The net wage rates of the male and
the female are denoted by respectively wm and wf. The yu-term stands for the net weekly
non-labor household income.
The fs-term in equation 1, referred to as family size, stands for the number of children
living in the household. In order to avoid taking a logarithm of zero we add one to the
number of children.
For simplicity of exposition we start by assuming 
 = 1, and also assume for the individual
utility functions, that
P
i = 1 for i = m;f for identication purposes.




Un;h = nUn;m + (1   n)Un;f (3)
8with
Un;i = i;1 ln(wmjhm + wfjhf + yu) + [i;2 + i;2I ln(fs + 1)]  ln(whm + whf)
+ i;3 ln(lei) + i;4 ln(whi) + i;5 ln(T   lei   whi)
When the optimization problem is described in the Lagrangean form, it follows that the
household utility function is concave, given explicit linear constraints. Hence, there exists
one unique optimum. Assuming for the moment that n is xed, we get four rst-order
conditions.
Let us assume that the household sets the male's leisure time at lem, and his household
production hours at whm, and, consequently, his job hours at jhm = (T  lem  whm), such
that the collective utility function is maximized. Then after re-ordering, the corresponding





























For lef and whf, we nd two similar equations. We note that each of the FOCs in (4)
and (5) consists of three terms. The rst and the third term refer to the `female' part of
the collective utility function. The explanation for this is that the public goods Y and H
gure in the utility functions of both partners. The hours whf that the female works in the
household aect the utility of the male. The same holds for the job working hours jhf of
the female, because the net wage of the female is part of the household income.
There is no need to spell out all the FOCs in detail. Let us consider the rst FOC in












T   lem   whm
We see that this expression is linear in the `male' utility parameters (m). The `coecients' x
are non-linear expressions in lem, lef, whm, whf, wm, wf. For instance, the rst `coecient'
may be denoted as x1;m;1 = 1
Y .8 As m;2 does not appear in the rst FOC, we have
x1;m;2 = 0. For brevity, we denote the coecient vector of the rst FOC, referring to the
male's utility function, by a 6-vector function x1;m(lem;lef;whm;whf;wm;wf). We may write
@Um
@lem = x0
1;mm. In a similar way we may derive
@Uf
















The index 1 refers to the x-vector in the rst FOC. The other FOCs with respect to











1m (1   )x0
1f
x0
2m (1   )x0
2f
x0
3m (1   )x0
3f
x0
























5 = 0 (7)
where X0
m and X0













For convenience, we introduce the shorthand notation z = (lem;whm;lef;whf) for the solu-
8Note that Y = wm  (T   lem   whm) + wf  (T   lef   whf) + yu.
10tion vector. The left-hand-side of (7) is the gradient of the household utility function Uh(z).
We shall write it sometimes as the 4-vector U0
h(z), or alternatively as Uz. The above system
describes the equilibrium where the gradient vector equals the zero vector. Similarly, we will
denote the (4  4)-matrix of second-order derivatives of Uh(z) by U00
h or Uzz.
Specication of the Pareto-weight
The Pareto-weight distribution between the male and the female (;1   ) is assumed to
depend on their personal characteristics: in short, a vector (vm;vf) of weight characteristics.
As is mentioned by Browning et al. (2006), a model that makes use of a Pareto-weight is
usually referred to as a collective model. They conclude that, when the Pareto-weight is
not assumed to depend on prices (or, in our model, wages) then the model is equivalent to
the standard unitary model. The dependency of the Pareto-weight function on wage rates
is therefore a crucial element in our model.
In this paper the Pareto-weights will depend on the following distribution factors: the
hourly wages of the two partners (wm;wf), the number of children (fs), the ages of the two
partners (age), and weekly non-labor income yu.9
Considering for the moment only the hourly wages of the two partners, we use the
convenient functional specication:
n(v) = N(m ln(wn;m) + f ln(wn;f)) (9)
where N() stands for the standard normal distribution function. The advantage of this
specication by means of a distribution function is that (v) 2 [0;1] always holds. If m =
 f and wm = wf, we nd (v) = 1
2. An increase of  implies that the utility function
of the male is weighted more heavily in the collective utility function at the expense of the
utility of the female. The male's weight (v) is expected to be increasing in the male's wage
9We notice that the very presence of children might be the result of decisions regarding fertility that most
likely re
ect bargaining within the household. However, modelling the decision of having children is beyond
the scope of the paper.
11and, inversely, is expected to be decreasing in the female's wage. Generally the weight will
be asymmetric, except if m =  f and wm = wf. If we add a constant 0 to the argument
in N(), one of the partners is structurally overweighted. For example, if 0 > 0; the utility
function of the male is structurally overweighed. However, as in our empirical estimates we
found a statistically insignicant value for 0, we drop it from our model.
3 The Estimation Method




of N observations of households n. Clearly, as econometricians usually do, we can try to
solve the system of FOCs for each n, yielding predicted values b lem;n, b lef;n, c whm;n, c whf;n
as functions of the individual wages wm;n, wf;n and the unknown parameter vector (;).
However, those functions would be highly non-linear in  and , and consequently it would
be dicult to estimate the unknown parameters. We propose a more convenient indirect
estimation method, similar to the Wald-test criterion approach (see also Wales and Woodland












5 = 0 8n (10)
where we assume for a start that the n are known. We write:
h
nX0






Obviously the matrix equality (10) will not hold exactly; so we assume
X
0
n = "n (11)
12where we introduce the error vector "  N(0;"), and we assume that the behavior of house-
holds is not correlated, that is, E("n;"n0) = 0 if n 6= n0. The (44)-error-covariance-matrix
" may be non-diagonal in order to include the possibility that errors in time-use deci-
sions are correlated. Given the overall time budget constraints and the probable correlation
between the partners' decisions, such a correlation is probable.








n with respect to . We exclude the `trivial' solution  = 0
by adding the two identifying conditions
P
m = 1 and
P
f = 1.
The estimation problem is solved by iteration. We start by assuming m = f = 1,
yielding rst-round Pareto-weight coecients 
(1)
n . Note that these Pareto-coecients are




Consider the system of four equations:
yn = X
0
n + "n (12)
where we introduce the nuisance vector yn. Surprisingly, the system can be estimated in a
simple way by the method of Seemingly Unrelated Least Squares (SUR). If we set yn = 0 for
all n, estimation of this system under the constraints
P




n with respect to  under the constraints.
The estimation of the collective model is somewhat more complex, as we have to estimate
the parameters m;f as well, which requires a non-linear estimation method. On the basis




f . Using these estimated -values, we
then obtain (2). With (2) we estimate (2), and we continue this iterative process until
convergence is reached.
The asymptotic covariance matrix ; of the parameter estimates (b  ; b ) is derived in
the usual way.
134 Data and Estimation Results
We use the 2003-wave (l) of the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS), where we consider a
subset of 1497 two-earner households. These households were interviewed between September
2002 and September 2003. The BHPS started in 1991 and is household-based; each adult
member of the household is interviewed each year. The main objective of the BHPS is to
give insight into the social and economic changes at the individual and household levels in
the UK.
The information that is used for this study has been derived from questions on how
individuals of two-earner households allocate their time. From the proposed empirical model
it follows that we are interested in the number of hours that individuals spend on leisure,
household tasks, and on their jobs.
Table 1 shows the summary statistics on the weekly hours spent on these dierent activ-
ities by males and females. Furthermore, Table 1 shows the net hourly wage rates of males
and females. The non-labor household income yu is dened as the sum of weekly income
from social benets, income from investments and transfer income. By the latter, we mean
income that is transferred from one household to another household (for example, gifts from
parents to their children). Our data set, unfortunately, does not allow us to make a clear
distinction between the origins of the unearned income.
-Insert Table 1 about here-
As expected, the descriptive statistics indicate that men earn a higher wage than women,
and spend more time on paid labor than women, while the opposite is true for the time spent
on household activities.
In the BHPS we have information on the hours that household members spend on house-
hold activities.The specic question is: \about how many hours do you spend on housework
in an average week, such as time spent on cooking, cleaning and doing the laundry?". While
cooking, doing the laundry and cleaning are activities that are explicitly stated in the ques-
tion, the addition of such as shows that we can not be certain how housework is exactly
14dened. It is likely that housework captures the time spent on the explicitly stated activities,
but there may be more, such as child care. Consequently, the distinction between house-
work and leisure may be ambiguous, and therefore we leave the empirical denition to the
respondents themselves. Some love cooking and others hate it. For the former it is a leisure
activity, and for the latter it is work.
An important issue is that there is no certainty whether respondents consider child care
as housework or leisure. For child care we leave the implicit classication to the respondent
as well. Furthermore, these activities depend very much on the number of children.
Given the observed quantities of time that are allocated to certain activities, and assuming
that individuals maximize their utility following the collective model we can estimate the
preference parameters (m;f). At this point we wish to introduce some more 
exibility
with respect to the parameter 
 , which up to now we assumed to equal 1 for convenience.
For the estimation we will distinguish four dierent alternatives:
 Alternative 1: 
 = 1 and i;2I=0, (i = 1;2).
 Alternative 2: 
 = 1 and i;2I to be estimated
 Alternative 3: 
 to be estimated and i;2I = 0
 Alternative 4: 
 to be estimated and i;2I to be estimated.
While we assume for Alternatives 1 and 2 that 
 = 1 and consequently that the number
of household hours of male and female are perfect substitutes, this assumption is relaxed in
Alternatives 3 and 4. For the second and fourth alternative an interaction term is included.
Table 2 presents the parameter estimates for (m;f).
-Insert Table 2 about here-
We note that the FOCs with respect to whi are not linear in 
 and therefore we estimate
the 
 parameter numerically. We let 
 vary with a grid-width of 0:025, and for each alter-
native value of 
, choose that value of 
 that gives the highest log-likelihood of the system.
The dierences in log-likelihood between the four dierent alternatives are non-signicant.
15The 
-parameters are 0:85 and 0:925 for Alternatives 3 and 4, respectively, and hence
the marginal rate of substitution is smaller than 1. The explanation for this result might
be explained by the fact that, since women on average spend more time on household tasks
than men, the female's marginal household work productivity may be somewhat less than
that of the male. Men may be more ecient when spending an additional hour on household
tasks. We note that 
 should be interpreted as the ratio of marginal productivities.
When concentrating on the preference parameters, we note that the interaction parameter
drops out of the model for Alternatives 1 and 3 and hence there are no estimation results for
the interaction of family size with the total household production. We see that all parameter
values are signicant except the interaction eect of total household production with family
size for the male in Alternatives 2 and 4.
The estimation results appear to be robust for the dierent alternatives10. The main
variables in the utility function for the four dierent alternatives appear to be leisure and
household income, for both the male and the female. The preference for total household
production is in
uenced by family size for the female, while this is not the case for the male.
A Wald test is performed in order to test whether the preference parameters of men and
women are on average equal. The test results are printed in Table 3:
-Insert Table 3 about here-
An x-sign indicates that the parameters are signicantly dierent from one another, while
a 0-sign indicates that the parameters do not signicantly dier. The test reveals that the
coecients for males and females are, in general, signicantly dierent. The exceptions are
the preference parameters for household work in Alternative 1 and the preference parameters
for joint household production in Alternatives 2 and 4.
We see that male and female leisure are the most important variables by far, followed
by household income. The male is more income-oriented than the female and vice versa
for leisure. Job working hours are negative for both, but more so for the male. Finally,
10Actually, the results are sometimes incredibly robust, with a t-ratio of 256. As all estimates are plausible,
and we have tested several other specications, we could do nothing other than accept this robustness.
16housework has a weakly positive eect, where the female derives somewhat more satisfaction
from it than the male.
In order to obtain some more insight into the estimates of Table 2, we can derive the
marginal rate of substitution between leisure hours and job hours for the male and the female
separately. Since the estimates of the coecients for the four dierent alternatives are quite
similar, we will only derive the marginal rate of substitution between leisure hours and job
hours for Alternative 1. The marginal rates of substitution for the other three alternatives
are approximately equal. The marginal rate of substitution between leisure hours and job
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From Table 1 we can obtain the average net hourly wage of the male (7.947 pound) and the
average net household income per week ($349+$209 = $558). From Table 2 we obtain the









 jhm = 0 (15)
Rewriting 15 gives:
0:006  lem + (0:004   0:001)jhm = 0 (16)
It follows that the (marginal) shadow price of one leisure hour is worth about 1
2 a job hour,
and accordingly its money value would be about 1
2 the male 's hourly wage. Doing the same
for females, we nd that the (marginal) shadow price of one hour of female leisure is worth
about 1
7 of a job hour and its money value is 1
7 of the female's hourly wage.
In Table 4 we present the parameters of the Pareto-weight function for the dierent
17Alternatives 1-4, where we add the distribution factors children and age. We see that the
hourly wage rates are by far the most important. The weight of the male's wage is about
equal to that of the female, while the sign of the female coecient is negative, as we expected.
The utility of the female is weighted more heavily if there are children in Alternative 1, where
children below age 5 get more weight compared with children of 5 years and older, while
the eect of children above 11 years is non-signicant. Indeed, it may be expected that
in traditional households the bargaining power of the female increases with the presence
of young children. This child eect is also found for the other alternatives, but there it is
non-signicant.
The non-labor household income is slightly signicant for the rst alternative and non-
signicant in all other alternatives.
The average (male) Pareto-weight coecient (n) is slightly higher than 0.5 for Alter-
native 1, 3 and 4. For the Alternative 2 it is just below 0.5. In general it seems that the
Pareto-weight distribution in British households is on average about 50-50 for the male and
the female within the two-earner households.
We note that the chosen functional form of the Pareto-weight function allows for all
sample average values between 0 and 1. The Pareto-weight eects are based on a sub-sample
of two-earner households, and so it is possible that the average value of the Pareto-weight
coecient will be dierent for one-earner households. In Figure 1 we depict the distribution
density function of n over the sample for the dierent Alternatives 1-4.
-Insert Figure 1 about here-
Figure 1 shows that, although on average the Pareto-weight is equally divided between
the male and the female, there is much variation in the distribution of Pareto-weight between
individual households.
-Insert Table 4 about here-
We conclude that the Pareto-weight distribution seems to be dominated by the ratio of
hourly wages wm
wf , where m and f are about equal. This is empirical evidence for the idea
18that bargaining power in marriage is determined by dierences in (potential) wage rates.
This was also suggested by Pollak (2005).
The child eect is signicant when the household preference parameter does not depend
on family size, and when we do not allow for gender dierences in household productivity.
However, when the preference for joint household production also depends on family size,
the female tends to weight the total household production more heavily when family size
increases. We do not nd this eect for males. The child eect in the Pareto-weight function
then becomes non-signicant. Furthermore, when we allow for dierences in the marginal
productivity between men and women we also nd that the children eects does not signi-
cantly in
uence the Pareto-weight distribution. Hence, it seems that the child eect that is
found for the Alternative 1 is captured by the eects of family size and gender dierences in
household productivity for the other alternatives.
Finally, we present a `typical' variance-correlation matrix of the error vector in Table
5. This matrix is a mixture of a covariance- and a correlation- matrix. The diagonal cells
contain variances, while the o-diagonal cells contain correlation ratios. Using the relation
ij = ij
pii  jj we may retrieve the covariances. The matrix Table 5 refers to the
case 
 = 1. The variance-correlation matrix does not change much over the dierent 
-
specications. The matrix below shows clearly that the error-terms are correlated.
-Insert Table 5 about here-
5 Wage, child and substitution eects
In this model wm and wf are considered to be exogenous. Now we consider the question how
labor supply and leisure consumption react on wage changes.
Let us assume that the wage vector (wm,wf) = w changes by w. Then what will be
the change in z(w)? We return to the system in (7) and assume that w(0);z(0) represents the
situation ex ante, and that w(1);z(1) is the new equilibrium after the change of wages.
We notice that the (4  12)-matrix X is a function of w. Hence, dierentiating the
19elements of the matrix X also with respect to w, we add two columns to the matrix Uzz,
producing the (46)  matrix (Uzz Uzw). The matrix Uzw is a (42)  matrix. According
to equation (2),
@Uh
@z =  @Um
@z +(1 )
@Uf
@z = 0. We have to take into account that  depends
on the wage vector as well, and hence:
Uzz =   Um;zz + (1   )  Uf;zz





where the last element is the product of a (4  1)- matrix and a (1  2) matrix, resulting
in a (4  2)- matrix.
Denoting z(1)   z(0) = z, the new equilibrium has to satisfy the equation:
Uzzz + Uzww = 0 (18)












The eect may be split into a usual gross substitution eect and a separate `power' shift
eect. Because of the identity jh + wh + le  24, we nd for the eects on job hours of the
























The corresponding elasticities are
@jh
@w : w
jh. The analysis was performed under the assumption
that households were in equilibrium in z(0). The elasticities in the sample average, that is
all matrices evaluated in the sample mean, are presented in Table 6.
-Insert Table 6 about here-
20Table 6 indicates that there is both household members have a backward-bending labor-
supply curve. The income eect dominates the substitution eect. When the hourly wage
rate increases, individuals tend to substitute paid labor hours for leisure. This eect is
more pronounced for the female partner than for the male. The average wage elasticities
are strongly in
uenced by the interaction eect. Letting the preference for joint household
production depend on family size, the average wage elasticities are more negative for the
male ( 0:994 for Alternative 2 and  1:019 for Alternative 4) and less negative for the
female ( 0:591 for Alternative 2, and even  0:048 for Alternative 4).
The labor-supply curve in terms of the hourly wage rate of the partner is forward-bending.
It appears that individuals tend to replace leisure hours by paid job hours when the wage
of their partner increases. With the exception of Alternative 2, the empirical results also
suggest that individuals replace leisure hours by household production hours when the hourly
wage of the partner increases. When women contribute more in terms of money, the husband
is motivated to keep up with her in terms of eort in earning money and by becoming more
productive in the household. The same holds vice versa. From a bargaining perspective, it
may be the case that, if the bargaining position of the female is improved due to her wage
increase, the male supplies more hours of labor to maintain his bargaining position in terms
of his contribution to household income within the household.
In general, the estimation results suggest that the income eect dominates the substitu-
tion eect when the hourly wage rate increases. The relative `power' of the individual, whose
wage increases, is increased; as a result he/she tends towards a more favorable time allocation
scheme, while the partner shifts towards a more unfavorable time allocation scheme.
As we consider a sample of two-earner households, this might considerably in
uence the
results. By considering only two-earner households, we do not consider the initial choice of
whether a partner participates in the labor market at all. We merely observe the outcome
of this decision process for the case where both partners do participate on the labor market.
For these households, household income is on average higher, and as a consequence we might
nd a backward-bending labor supply curve for both household members.
21On the basis of the estimation results of the last section and the wage eects, the unitary
model is rejected in favor of the collective model. The empirical results suggest that the
preference parameters of the male and the female dier signicantly and that the Pareto-
weight distribution is signicantly in
uenced by the dierence in wage rates. Furthermore,
a wage rate increase of the male is dierently compensated by the female in terms of labor
hours, and vice versa (i.e. the Slutsky symmetry condition does not hold).
We assume that household income consists of three components: namely, the labor income
of male and female and an additional unearned income yu. The additional unearned income
















We see that an additional household income increase has an eect on all time variables
simultaneously. The unearned income eects may be derived in the usual way and the
results are shown in Table 7.
-Insert Table 7 about here-
The distribution of yu in the sample is heavily skewed to the right or, in other words,
the median value yu is smaller than the average value of yu. Most households do not `earn'
much non-labor household income. Table 7 suggests for all alternatives that an increase of
household income due to unearned income induces a shift to more leisure hours for male and
female, although the eect is small. The opposite eect is found for paid job hours with the
exception of the female job hour eect for Alternative 1. The eect on household production
hours is ambiguous.
Unfortunately, the data do not provide information on who is the provider of the non-
labor income. Hence, it is impossible to split yu into a male and a female part.












The estimates are presented Table 8.
-Insert Table 8 about here-
The columns indicate the number of children between certain age levels. For instance,
c02 refers to the number of children present in the household who are aged between zero and
two, and so on.
We see that the eect of young children is considerable but that the eect for children
above 5 years of age is not very robust. The child eect will most likely be dierent if
one-earner households were considered as well. Clearly these eects will be aected by the
British organisation of school times and childcare.
It appears that women tend to work fewer hours on the labor market when there are
more children present in the household younger than 5. Men, on the other hand, tend to
do the opposite. When there are more young children in the household, women usually
specialize in household tasks, while men specialize in labor market tasks. Hence, women
replace paid labor hours by household production hours, and men replace their leisure time
with job market hours.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we estimate the separate utility functions of male and female household mem-
bers on the basis of a public good version of the collective household model. By assuming
that each spouse's leisure is an exclusive good the model is non-parametrically identied, as
is theoretically shown by Chiappori & Ekeland (2006).
We nd that the ordinal utility functions of males and females, and consequently their
indierence curves, are signicantly dierent. This provides additional evidence for the
23collective approach. Although the model is non-linear in the outcome variables male leisure,
female leisure, and so on, it appears possible to estimate the utility parameters by means of
a simple Seemingly Unrelated Regression approach.
We estimated four alternative models. For Alternatives 1 and 2, it is assumed that the
number of household hours of male and female are perfect substitutes; this assumption is
relaxed in Alternatives 3 and 4. For Alternatives 2 and 4 an interaction term is included,
where joint household production interacts with family size, while we assume that there is
no interaction eect in Alternative 1 and 3.
The estimation results appear to be fairly robust for the dierent Alternatives 1-4. When
we do not postulate that household hours of the male and the female are perfect substitutes,
we nd that the male is slightly more ecient in performing (his) household tasks. The
explanation for this might be that the female spends, on average, more time on household
tasks than men. One additional hour on household production of the female might then
be less productive compared with one additional hour of household production hour by the
male. Note that this is a comparison at the margin.
The most important variables in the utility function appear to be leisure and household
income, for both male and female. When we assume that the preference for total household
production is in
uenced by family size, we nd for the female utility function that this
preference is in
uenced by family size, but this eect is not found for the male.
The negative values of own-wage labor supply elasticities imply that both partners have
a backward-bending labor supply curve; we note that for females this result diers from
historical results. We conclude, therefore, that the labor supply curve of women tends to
resemble that of men. An explanation for the backward-bending labor supply curve for
women is that there are now more women with a high income than in the past. For these
women, apparently, the income eect dominates the substitution eect, meaning that they
reduce their hours of work rather than increasing them when their own wage rate increases.
Research on female labor supply conducted in the 1980s and 1990s generally found high
wage elasticities. Typically, a wage elasticity of around 1 was found. Furthermore, the
24female labor supply curve was forward-bending for the entire range of female wages (see
Killingsworth & Heckman (1986)). That seems to have changed over time because of the
increase in female labor supply and the changed attitude towards female labor participation.
Apparently women's behavior on the labor market nowadays resembles that of men, although
the descriptive statistics still indicate that the hourly wage rate and the amount of labor
supply is, on average, lower for females compared with males.
We also explained the Pareto-weight distribution within the household. We nd for
this sample of two-earner households that the weight is about evenly distributed between
the partners. Still there is considerable variation between households. The Pareto-weight
distribution depends mainly on the relative hourly wages (earning potential). The relative
weight of the female compared with that of her partner is increased if there are young children
in the household, when we assume that there is no family size interaction with household
production and that the household hours of the male and the female are perfect substitutes.
When we relax these assumptions the child eect disappears.
The model discussed in this paper can be extended in several ways. First, it seems in-
teresting to examine how results vary with dierent model specications. Second, it might
be that other characteristics are important when discussing the division of labor and house-
hold tasks, which in its turn in
uence the power distribution. Third, we only considered
the special sub-sample of two-earner households. This simplied the analysis considerably,
as one-earner families re
ect a corner solution of the household decision problem. Fourth,
it would be interesting to estimate a collective model of time allocation over time, since
it is then possible to observe changes in the division of labor and household tasks due to
household specic events.
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28Table 1: Summary Statistics
#obs: mean Std. Dev. 10% 90%
percentile percentile
Leisure hours male 1497 118.742 9.470 107 128
Household hours male 1497 5.328 4.205 1 10
Job hours male 1497 43.931 8.953 37 55
Leisure hours female 1497 121.707 11.616 108 137
Household hours female 1497 13.917 8.548 5 25
Job hours female 1497 32.376 11.460 16 45
Hourly wage male 1497 7.947 8.526 4.50 11.67
Hourly wage female 1497 6.450 2.894 3.75 9.93
Unearned income 1497 40.627 73.420 0 834.46
29Table 2: Parameter estimates for 
Alternative 1 Male Female
Estimate t-value Estimate t-value
leisure 0.755 256.33 0.778 213.67
housework 0.003 20.93 0.004 7.3
household production (H) 0.014 7.73 0.032 15
H interaction term . . . .
household income 0.261 57.33 0.204 60.23
job working hours -0.033 -13.29 -0.017 -21.59
Alternative 2 Male Female
Estimate t-value Estimate t-value
leisure 0.757 219.190 0.823 193.330
housework 0.004 23.510 0.002 3.840
household production (H) 0.013 6.010 0.019 9.700
H interaction term 0.002 0.570 0.013 3.910
household income 0.293 61.690 0.180 54.720
job working hours -0.069 -26.470 -0.037 -29.140
Alternative 3 Male Female
Estimate t-value Estimate t-value
leisure 0.739 259.590 0.794 224.260
housework 0.003 17.360 0.006 13.830
household production (H) 0.026 15.490 0.016 7.990
H interaction term . . . .
household income 0.268 62.220 0.203 61.730
job working hours -0.036 -15.540 -0.019 -23.930
Alternative 4 Male Female
Estimate t-value Estimate t-value
leisure 0.741 237.250 0.767 206.160
housework 0.003 19.070 0.005 11.160
household production (H) 0.020 9.130 0.015 6.080
H interaction term 0.005 1.150 0.028 6.380
household income 0.269 62.160 0.203 59.650
job working hours -0.037 -15.640 -0.018 -23.900
Alt. 1 Alt. 2 Alt. 3 Alt. 4
 0.532 0.471 0.542 0.534

 1 1 0.85 0.925
N 1497 1497 1497 1497
30Table 3: `Joint' Wald test to test equality of preference parameters
Prob > 2
Preference parameter w.r.t Alt. 1 Alt. 2 Alt. 3 Alt. 4
Leisure x x x x
housework 0 x x x
Joint household production (H) x 0 x 0
H interaction term . x . x
Household income x x x x
Job working hours x x x x
Note: x indicates that the preference parameter of male and
female dier signicantly, 0 indicates that this is not the case
31Table 4: Estimates of the Power Function n
Alternative 1 Alternative 2
Estimate t-value Estimate t-value
Log(wmale) 0.593 25.710 0.592 22.620
Log(wfemale) -0.562 -25.260 -0.606 -23.260
Log(#-children 0/2+1) -0.094 -2.320 -0.078 -1.650
Log(#-children 3/4+1) -0.091 -2.170 -0.062 -1.270
Log(#-children 5/11+1) -0.056 -2.370 -0.023 -0.860
Log(#-children 12/16+1) -0.038 -1.320 0.011 0.340
Log(#-children >16+1) -0.052 -0.980 0.002 0.040
Log(agemale) 0.014 0.210 -0.056 -0.710
Log(agefemale) -0.036 -0.520 0.019 0.240
Log(yu+1) 0.010 1.750 -0.004 -0.540
N 1497 1497
Alternative 3 Alternative 4
Estimate t-value Estimate t-value
Log(wmale) 0.613 26.310 0.625 26.200
Log(wfemale) -0.621 26.820 -0.628 26.590
Log(#-children 0/2+1) -0.025 -0.620 -0.038 -0.910
Log(#-children 3/4+1) -0.023 -0.560 -0.039 -0.900
Log(#-children 5/11+1) 0.001 0.050 -0.009 -0.380
Log(#-children 12/16+1) 0.012 0.410 0.004 0.140
Log(#-children >16+1) -0.006 -0.110 -0.011 -0.200
Log(agemale) -0.024 -0.340 -0.026 -0.370
Log(agefemale) 0.024 0.330 0.016 0.210
Log(yu+1) 0.005 0.810 0.006 0.910
N 1497 1497
Note:  signicant at the 10% level,  signicant at the5 % level,
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Figure 1: Frequency histograms of n for the dierent alternatives
Table 5: Variance-correlation matrix of the error vector
1 2 3 4
1 6.7910 7
2 0.4106 2.3010 6
3 0.7201 0.3787 5.3810 7
4 0.3933 0.6488 0.2488 1.64 10 6
33Table 6: Average Wage Elasticities
Alternative 1 Alternative 2
wm wf wm wf
lem 0.211 -0.197 0.186 -0.230
whm -1.409 0.805 -2.027 1.421
jhm -0.795 0.862 -0.994 1.138
lef -0.237 0.195 -0.224 0.228
whf 0.704 -0.577 -0.825 0.856
jhf 1.242 -1.136 0.493 -0.591
Alternative 3 Alternative 4
wm wf wm wf
lem 0.134 -0.144 0.261 -0.291
whm -2.151 1.757 -1.830 0.584
jhm -0.283 0.353 -1.019 1.238
lef -0.260 0.241 -0.073 0.118
whf 1.256 -1.272 1.021 -0.587
jhf 1.266 -1.042 -0.429 -0.048
Table 7: Average Weekly Unearned Income Elasticities
Alt. 1 Alt. 2 Alt. 3 Alt. 4
lem 0.035 0.034 0.019 0.028
whm 0.105 0.138 -0.061 0.061
jhm -0.108 -0.110 -0.037 -0.091
lef 0.000 0.010 0.022 0.005
whf -0.004 -0.014 0.123 0.013




34Table 8: Child Eects
Alternative 1
c02 c34 c511 c1215 c1618
lem -0.0042 -0.0051 -0.0106 -0.0018 -0.0024
whm 0.1002 -0.0050 -0.0122 0.0287 -0.0124
jhm -0.0309 0.0134 0.0280 -0.0026 0.0078
lef 0.0040 0.0056 0.0101 0.0030 0.0028
whf -0.1085 0.0133 0.0109 -0.0034 0.0073
jhf 0.0030 -0.0129 -0.0143 0.0140 -0.0124
Alternative 2
c02 c34 c511 c1215 c1618
lem -0.0076 -0.0037 -0.0066 0.0009 0.0000
whm -0.0363 0.0137 0.0140 -0.0070 -0.0008
jhm 0.0244 0.0005 0.0060 0.0020 0.0002
lef 0.0049 0.0023 0.0023 -0.0008 0.0000
whf 0.0191 -0.0159 -0.0608 0.0188 0.0010
jhf -0.0321 0.0025 -0.0050 0.0011 0.0000
Alternative 3
c02 c34 c511 c1215 c1618
lem -0.0083 -0.0012 0.0003 0.0013 -0.0004
whm -0.1142 -0.0027 0.0005 -0.0155 -0.0040
jhm 0.0445 0.0035 -0.0009 0.0011 0.0018
lef 0.0098 0.0012 -0.0003 -0.0017 0.0005
whf 0.0835 0.0033 -0.0002 0.0128 0.0019
jhf -0.0745 -0.0017 0.0012 0.0002 -0.0026
Alternative 4
c02 c34 c511 c1215 c1618
lem -0.0204 -0.0043 -0.0086 0.0041 0.0008
whm -0.0713 -0.0328 -0.0319 0.0329 -0.0027
jhm 0.0609 0.0180 0.0260 -0.0142 -0.0094
lef 0.0346 0.0052 0.0192 -0.0094 0.0032
whf 0.0504 0.0262 0.0182 -0.0164 -0.0009
jhf -0.2644 -0.0287 -0.1299 0.0700 -0.0279
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